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The optimal mean photon number (µ) for quantum cryptography is the average pho-
ton number per transmitted pulse that results in the highest delivery rate of distilled
cryptographic key bits, given a specific system scenario and set of assumptions about
Eve’s capabilities. Although many experimental systems have employed a mean photon
number (µ) of 0.1 in practice, several research teams have pointed out that this value
is somewhat arbitrary. In fact, various optimal values for µ have been described in the
literature.
In this paper we offer a detailed analytic model for an experimental, fiber-based
quantum cryptographic system, and an explicit set of reasonable assumptions about
Eve’s current technical capabilities. We explicitly model total system behavior ranging
from physical effects to the results of quantum cryptographic protocols such as error
correction and privacy amplification. We then derive the optimal photon number (µ) for
this system in a range of scenarios. One interesting result is that µ ≈ 1.1 is optimal for
a wide range of realistic, fiber-based QKD systems; in fact, it provides nearly 10 times
the distilled throughput of systems that employ a more conventional µ = 0.1, without
any adverse affect on system security, as judged against a set of reasonable assumptions
about Eve’s current capabilities.
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1 Background and Problem Statement
It now seems likely that Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) techniques can provide practical
building blocks for highly secure networks, and in fact may offer valuable cryptographic ser-
vices, such as unbounded secrecy lifetimes, that can be difficult to achieve by other techniques.
Accordingly, a number of commercial and research organizations have begun to build and op-
erate complete QKD systems. As quantum cryptography has started the transition from
laboratory demonstrations to working systems in the field, questions of operating efficiency
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and realistic levels of security have taken on a heightened importance.a
A wide range of techniques has been proposed for quantum cryptography, and many have
been experimentally demonstrated; see Gisin et al. [1] for a superb overview. However, in
realistic settings, such as operation through the atmosphere or through tens of kilometers
of telecommunications fiber, even the most efficient of these techniques currently provide
no more than roughly 1,000 distilledbbits per second, depending on channel losses, choice
of eavesdropping threat model, and a large number of technical parameters. While this
key generation rate is more than sufficient for rapid rekeying of conventional cryptographic
algorithms—for example it allows rekeying of an AES algorithm with fresh 256-bit keys 4 times
per second—a faster key generation rate would allow a large number of cryptographically
protected traffic flows to be rekeyed at a given rate. In addition, it is far too low for most uses
of one-time pads. An important practical question, therefore, is how to increase this rate.
A number of different approaches may contribute to improved distilled key generation
rates: detector efficiencies may be improved, e.g., by novel forms of detectors; pulse rates
may be increased; and entropy estimates may be refined so that less privacy amplification
is required for a given observed level of noise. Promising efforts are underway in all these
areas (e.g. [2, 3, 4]). This paper explores yet another avenue to increasing the key generation
rate, namely, by finding an optimal value for the mean number of photons emitted in each
pulse, i.e., that which maximizes the distilled key generation rate for a given scenario and set
of eavesdropping assumptions. This mean photon number is often designated µ in the QKD
literature.
This paper provides a detailed, quantitative analysis of the interaction between µ, channel
attenuation, and privacy-amplified key generation rates, and compares the results with prior
research on optimal mean photon number. We specifically consider a phase-modulated system,
with attenuated laser source and cooled InGaAs APDs, designed for telecommunications fiber;
however the results can be readily generalized to other systems.
One interesting result is that µ ≈ 1.1 is optimal for a wide range of realistic, fiber-based
QKD systems under a reasonable eavesdropping threat model; in fact, it provides nearly 10
times the distilled throughput of systems that employ a more conventional µ = 0.1, without
any adverse affect on system security. For many steeped in the field, it may seem counter-
intuitive—even downright false—that a mean photon number as large as 1, let alone greater
than 1, may be possible without sacrificing all security. However, as Prof. Gisin et al. have
noted in their magisterial survey of quantum cryptography [1], “multiphoton pulses do not
necessarily constitute a threat to key security, but they limit the key creation rate because
they imply that more bits must be discarded during key distillation.” This paper may be
viewed as an elaboration, and preliminary quantification, of that important remark.
2 Review of the Current Art
Although most practitioners of quantum cryptography have now converged upon a mean
photon number (µ) of 0.1 as a good benchmark value, “contrary to a frequent misconception,
there is nothing special about a µ value of 0.1, even though it has been selected by most
aThe opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors alone, and do not necessarily reflect the views
of the United States Department of Defense, DARPA, or the United States Air Force.
bIn our terminology, a “distilled” key has been sifted, error corrected, and privacy amplified, and is thus ready
to use as key material.
Pearson and Elliott 3
experimentalists. The optimal value—i.e., the value that yields the highest key exchange rate
after distillation—depends on the optical losses in the channel and on assumptions about
Eve’s technology.” [1] In fact, in recent years, at least three leading research teams have
carefully investigated the optimal mean photon rate, and have come to differing conclusions.
Accordingly, this section recapitulates both the widespread rationale for µ = 0.1, and the
previous research on the relationship of µ to distilled key rate.
As will be seen, for some years the QKD community has held, in effect, an ongoing
discussion of the optimal mean photon number for various contexts, but generally as side
comments within papers devoted to other topics. As a result, it has been difficult to find a
detailed and explicit linkage between eavesdropping threat models and optimal mean photon
numbers.
The origin of the value 0.1 for the mean photon number was the very first experimental
realization of QKD by Bennett et al. in 1992 [5]. This early work analyzed various kinds
of attacks on the small number of multi-photon pulses produced, including one version of
unambiguous state discrimination, and concluded that unambiguous state discrimination was
impossible for such a small µ without significantly biasing the detector statistics at Bob. Later
researchers have shown that this conclusion is incorrect [6]. However, the number of bits that
Eve can discover is very small, and Bennett et al. left a significant safety margin in their
estimate. The attacks they considered feasible involved intercepting one photon from each
multi-photon pulse and measuring it. For each such pulse that reaches Bob, they assume Eve
gains one bit of information, thus implicitly allowing Eve to have a quantum memory and to
measure the photon only when its basis is disclosed.
Many other experimental systems, including ours, borrowed from [5] the value of 0.1 for
µ as well as the estimate of Eve’s advantage from photon-number splitting (PNS) attacks.
Two experimental teams, from Los Alamos [7] and IBM Almaden [8], then calculated optimal
numerical values for µ in their systems, based on this estimate. For the free-space system
used by Los Alamos, this value of µ was 0.4, while for IBM’s “plug-and-play” fiber-based
system it was 0.3. The IBM Almaden group also examined the throughput vs. mean photon
number for a number of different eavesdropping models.
On the theoretical side, Gilbert and Hamrick [6] performed an extensive analysis of possible
attacks on multi-photon pulses, including splitting, unambiguous state discrimination, and
surreptitiously replacing the channel to Bob with a perfectly transparent one. In short, they
selected a more formidable eavesdropping model than posited in the analyses of Bennett,
Los Alamos, or IBM Almaden. Granting Eve such powers, they produced a much more
conservative estimate of the amount of information Eve might gain. They also analyzed
the optimum mean photon number in one specific scenario, an aircraft to a LEO satellite,
and found it to be 0.455, although in this case they allow Eve less power than in a fiber
link—specifically, she is not able to replace the channel with a lossless one.
These differing estimates are further compared in section 5.
3 Our Analytical Approach
Our analysis, in the following section, is derived from a moderately detailed mathematical
model of a full QKD system for use in telecommunications fiber, including both physical
effects and the outcomes of higher level protocols, validated against two working systems in
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the laboratory. This section briefly describes our working systems (the concrete subjects of
analysis), then discusses the major elements in our analytic model. Appendix A contains the
full text of the model.
3.1 Functioning Systems for Quantum Cryptography
BBN, Boston University, and Harvard University are currently building a large-scale quantum
cryptography system, the DARPA Quantum Network, and fielding it into dark fiber in the
Cambridge, Massachusetts metropolitan area. See for example [9, 10] for details on this
network and its design goals. Two interoperable QKD systems in the DARPA Quantum
Network started 24x7 duty in October 2003; we call these ’Mark 2’ systems because they
replaced our first-generation link, which started continuous operation in December 2002.
These systems were inspired by a pioneering Los Alamos system [11] and designed to run
through telecommunications fiber as widely deployed today.
Each Mark 2 system employs a highly attenuated telecommunications laser at 1550.12
nm, phase modulation via unbalanced Mach-Zehnder interferometers, and thermo-electrically
cooled InGaAs avalanche photo detectors (APDs). Most Mark 2 electronics are implemented
by discrete components such as pulse generators. At present, incoming dim pulses are de-
tected by Epitaxx EPM 239 AA APDs cooled to approximately –40 degrees Centigrade and
gated during a pulse arrival period. Since custom cooling and electronics are required, we
designed and built our own cooler package to maintain the APDs at the requisite operating
temperatures. Even with this special treatment, they suffer considerably from low Quantum
Efficiency (QE), relatively high dark noise, and serious after-pulsing problems. These cooled
detectors form one of the most important bottlenecks in the overall system performance, as
they require on the order of 10 µsec to recover between detection events. The overall link has
been designed to run at up to 5 Mb/s transmit rate but with a dead-time circuit to disable
the APD after a detection event in order to accommodate this recovery interval and suppress
detector after-pulsing.
BBN’s QKD protocol stack is an industrial-strength implementation written in the C
programming language for ready portability to embedded real-time systems. At present all
protocol control messages are conveyed in IP datagrams so that control traffic can be conveyed
via an internet. Two aspects of BBN’s QKD protocol stack deserve special mention. First, it
implements a complete suite of QKD protocols. In fact, it implements multiple “plug compat-
ible” versions of some functions, e.g., it provides both the traditional BB84 sifting protocol
and the newer “Geneva” style sifting [12]. It also provides a choice of entropy estimation
functions including the well-known BBBSS92 estimates [5], Slutsky’s defense frontier analy-
sis [13], and the newer Myers-Pearson estimate [4]. We expect to add additional options and
variants as they are developed. Second, BBN’s QKD protocols have been carefully designed
to make it as easy as possible to plug in other QKD systems, i.e., to facilitate the introduction
of QKD links from other research teams into the overall DARPA Quantum Network.
3.2 Analytic Tools used in this Paper
Over the past two years, we have developed a Matlab / Octave model to analyze the ex-
pected efficiency of current and projected fiber-based QKD systems in the DARPA Quantum
Network. The complete model is provided in Appendix A. Some aspects of the model have
been derived from the QKD literature, but most have been developed from first principles.
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Dr. John Myers of Harvard University has provided many of the equations in this model; the
authors have provided the remainder. Of course the authors are solely responsible for any
flaws in this published model.
This model provides for a wide range of input parameters such as pulse rate, mean photon
number at Alice, attenuation, detector efficiency, dark count, and after-pulsing characteristics,
residual phase error in the Mach-Zehnder interferometers, and so forth. It also provides input
parameters for higher layers of the QKD protocol stack, such as the sifting protocol employed,
information revealed during error detection and correction, entropy estimation technique, etc.
We briefly discuss these inputs, and the associated calculations, in the following paragraphs.
Although the model provides basic estimates for a range of physical and protocol phenomena,
it is by no means complete. For example, it does not include any characterization of stray
light, of chromatic or polarization mode dispersion, and so forth. However, the current version
of this model has been validated against our QKD systems running both through a fiber spool
in the laboratory and through a 17km fiber loop between BBN and Harvard University, and
its results agree well with experimental measurement. Thus it appears to capture at least the
most important drivers for realistic system behavior.
As shown in Appendix A, the model inputs represent a fiber-based system with a 5 Mb/s
pulse rate, 0.1 mean photon number (µ), operating through 10.55 km of telecommunications
fiber with an overall fiber attenuation of 2.5 dB. The average receiver loss factor is 10.4 dB,
with a residual phase error in the Mach-Zehnder interferometers of 3 degrees after both passive
and active path length stabilization. The path length stabilization and framing overhead
results in a duty cycle of 80% for usable QKD bits. Detector efficiency is 13%, with mis-
steered light occurring in 0.9% of the detections, and a dark count probability of 2.8× 10−5
per pulse. At higher layers of the QKD protocol stack, the traditional BB84 sifting algorithm
is modeled, with the BBN variant of the Cascade error detection and correction protocol using
a block size of 4,096 bits with 64 sets, the traditional BBBSS92 [5] entropy estimate, and a
residual confidence level (the probability that Eve has more information than estimated) of
10−6. These values capture the current state of our QKD systems as of January 2004.
It should be apparent from inspection of Appendix A that these parameters can be readily
adjusted to model other fiber-based systems, e.g., different detector characteristics, protocol
behavior, and so forth. One could also extend the model to free-space systems, or systems
based on pairs of entangled photons, but this would require that additional equations be
added to the model rather than mere adjustment of input parameters.
4 Eavesdropping Model and Defense Function
The most critical factor driving an optimal choice of mean photon number is determining what
sort of attacks Eve can employ. For intercept-resend attacks on the single-photon pulses, there
is a fairly well-developed theory about how much privacy amplification is necessary [13, 4]. For
multi-photon pulses, a number of possible attacks have been proposed and analyzed [6, 14, 15],
but it is by no means clear that the list of possible attacks is complete yet [16]. Many of
the theoretically possible attacks are very far from practical implementation with current
technology.
Note that these assumptions about Eve’s abilities must be built into the privacy amplifi-
cation margin used in any working QKD system, so they are by no means idle questions. If
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one wishes to deploy QKD securely, one must choose these assumptions carefully. Once we
have chosen these assumptions and the privacy amplification formula, numerical optimization
techniques can determine the optimal multi-photon probability. Therefore it is useful to ex-
plicitly list a set of assumed capabilities for Eve for a given scenario, as the rates vary greatly
depending on the assumptions.
We must decide, for example, whether we wish to guard against an Eve possessing the
capabilities listed in Table 1. Many research results assume that Eve possesses all these
capabilities; for some papers it is difficult to determine exactly which capabilities are assumed.
Table 1. Eavesdropping model used in this analysis.
Eve Has? Potential Technological Capabilities for Eve
X Perfect detectors
X A perfect long-term quantum memory
X Adaptive beam-splitters, which split at most one photon from the
signal [16]
X Reliable quantum non-demolition measurement of the total number
of photons
The ability to perform unambiguous state discrimination on pulses
with 3 or more photons
The ability to discriminate multi-photon pulses in intercept/resend
attacks [1]
The ability to substitute low or zero-loss fiber, or to perform quantum
teleportation with small loss
It is our belief, following Gisin, et al. [1], that it is reasonable to guard against eaves-
dropping that is currently feasible, or may be in the not-too-distant future, rather than make
deployment infeasible by attempting to guard against theoretical attacks that may never be
possible. Note, in particular, that near-perfect detectors, particularly if they can resolve the
number of photons in a pulse, adaptive beam-splitters, or quantum non-demolition (QND)
measurements can all give us a reliable way to build a true single-photon source, which would,
in turn, render PNS attacks harmless. QKD is very likely to shift to true single-photon emit-
ters long before we need to worry about an eavesdropper with a long-term quantum memory.
It is one of the greatest virtues of QKD that, unlike classical cryptography, there is no risk
that a future powerful adversary endangers our communications in the present.
Accordingly, the check marks in Table 1 indicate which technology we assume Eve has
for the purposes of this analysis, and for the current operation of our working QKD systems.
We believe that these assumptions are reasonable for current scenarios, since many of the
postulated technologies appear to be beyond today’s current state of the art.
Finally, given this explicit set of assumptions about Eve’s current capabilities, one must
select an entropy estimate used as input for privacy amplification. This entropy estimate
includes Eve’s information from intercept-resend attacks, called by Slutsky et al. the “defense
function” [13]. Here we use results based on the original entropy estimate in BBBSS92, but our
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analytic model explicitly calculates three different entropy estimates (BBBSS92 [5], Slutsky
[13], Myers-Pearson [4]). The choice of optimal mean photon number is very similar for all
choices of entropy estimate.
5 Results and Discussions
Given all these assumptions, we can employ an analytic model (Appendix A) to calculate the
optimal mean photon number (µ) over a range of scenarios. Recall that the “optimal” value
is that which maximizes the delivery rate of distilled bits / second, i.e., optimizes across the
system-wide effects of multi-photon emission probabilities, attenuation, dark noise, sifting,
bits revealed during error detection and correction, and the necessary amount of privacy
amplification.
The model allows us to extrapolate system performance in a number of scenarios, e.g. if
we had longer fibers, a faster pulse rate, or better detectors. In particular, we can analyze
the effects of changing the mean photon number. In Figure 1 we vary only the mean photon
number µ, with all other parameters derived from one of our current QKD systems (with
10.55 km of optical fiber between Alice and Bob). It is very apparent that the current mean
photon number µ, approximately 0.1 photon, is far from optimal in this setting. Instead the
mean photon number µ should be slightly more than 1 (about 1.15) to achieve the optimal
distilled key rate.
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Fig. 1. Distilled Key Rate as a Function of Mean Photon Number (µ) for a 10.55 km fiber link
with 2.5 dB loss.
Another major objective in optimizing µ is to maximize the distance available for practical
QKD over metropolitan fiber. Figure 2 shows how the distilled key rate varies with both fiber
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length and µ, again given specific system characteristics (Appendix A) and the eavesdropping
model of Section 4.
As can be seen, the distilled key rate falls off dramatically with distance, and requires
high values of µ for long distances. These specific results are driven by the relatively low
quantum efficiency, and relatively high dark count, of our current InGaAs detector suite, but
the phenomenon is more general. Larger µ naturally leads to more photons at the receiver,
and correspondingly more raw key bits per second, but more importantly it keeps the valid
detect rate high compared to receiver dark noise. Dark noise with a highly attenuating
channel decreases the distilled rate in a very dramatic way because it translates directly into
a higher error rate. The error detection and correction protocol, such as Cascade, then must
reveal a substantial amount of information to correct the errors. Since it must be assumed,
conservatively, that all these errors are due to eavesdropping, the estimate of the remaining
entropy in the bits drops sharply.
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Fig. 2. Distilled Key Rate as a Function of Distance and Mean Photon Number (µ).
Since many factors affect the distilled key rate, it is not surprising that there is not a
single optimum value of µ to employ in all scenarios. However, for our systems, the optimum
value does not vary by much. Figure 3 shows the optimum µ for distances from zero to 50
km. The optimum varies by less than 20%, from about 1 to 1.2. The peak of the key rate
curve (Figure 1) is rather broad, so choosing a value of 1.0, say, for µ seems to be applicable
for a broad range of operating conditions.
Since our estimates of the optimal mean photon number are quite different from conven-
tional wisdom, careful review of the assumptions and calculations is in order. We believe
that Bennett, Los Alamos, IBM Almaden, and this paper all employ similar eavesdropping
models. This is important, because the eavesdropping threat model drives the calculations of
optimal mean photon number.
The main difference in our calculation from those of Los Alamos is as follows. They used,
following Bennett et al., a fairly rough estimate for the fraction of detected pulses that are
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Fig. 3. Optimal Mean Photon Number (µ) as a Function of Fiber Length.
vulnerable to splitting. Bennett’s (intentionally conservative) estimate was that Eve could
learn a fraction µ of the bits through beamsplitting. This obviously would never allow µ = 1,
since then Eve would learn all of the bits. But this is quite conservative indeed, since the
fraction m of non-empty pulses that contain multiple photons (all of which we want to assume
Eve intercepts) may be more precisely estimated by the Poisson distribution,
m = 1− µe
−µ
1− e−µ (1)
This fraction m is close to µ/2 when µ is small, but diverges farther from µ at higher val-
ues. Figure 4(a) shows the effect of this difference between the estimates on distilled key
rate for the specific scenario depicted in Figure 1. The estimate we use throughout this pa-
per (“revised Bennett”) is mN +
√
2 erf−1(c)
√
Nm(1−m) where m is defined above, and
c = 10−6 is a confidence parameter, the residual probability that Eve might gain more infor-
mation from multi-photon pulses. The original BBBSS92 [5] estimate (“original Bennett”) is
identical except for using m = µ.We are not the first to employ this revised estimate. Both
Lu¨tkenhaus [17] and Gilbert and Hamrick [6] derive their results with the correct multipho-
ton Poisson statistics, and indeed predict that for low loss and high efficiency detectors, the
optimum efficiency is achieved for mean photon numbers greater than 1. Without much dis-
cussion, the IBM Almaden results [8] included curves for the “revised Bennett” estimate as
well as the “original Bennett” estimate for a range of detector efficiencies and channel losses,
in a most interesting graph of the effect of µ on distilled key rate in other eavesdropping
models, including those of [6] and [17]. These graphs showed that under some circumstances
µ > 1 is optimal in these other models.
10 On the Optimal Mean Photon Number for Quantum Cryptography
Figure 4(b) shows the effect of using Gilbert and Hamrick’s estimate [6], based on a more
severe eavesdropping model. Since they allow Eve perfect unambiguous state discrimination
attacks and zero-loss fiber, it is not surprising that their estimate results in a far lower key
rate.
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for a 10.55 km fiber link with 2.5 dB loss.
The threat model treated in this paper has been implicitly assumed in the eavesdropping
estimates for multi-photon pulses provided by other research teams [5, 7, 8]. We believe it is
a plausible threat model, given current technology. It is, however, important to realize that
with larger values of µ we are moving out of the “comfort zone” of these assumptions. Certain
attacks that aren’t readily feasible at small µ become easier at µ = 1. For example, Bennett
et al. considered a special case of unambiguous state discrimination in [5], splitting incoming
pulses and measuring one portion in each basis. In some cases of 3 or more photon pulses,
the measurement would result in both detectors firing in one basis and one firing in the other.
When this happens, Eve can generate a new signal (close to Bob) without introducing any
errors. For small values of µ, Bennett et al. concluded this attack was harmless. However,
when µ = 1 and with perfect detectors for Eve, this attack becomes feasible with a fiber loss
of about 18 dB, corresponding to approximately 90km of fiber at 0.2 dB/km attenuation.c
Another attack examined by Gisin et al. [1] involves improving the odds of intercept/resend
attacks by splitting the beam, measuring each half in a different basis, and using detectors
that can determine the number of photons in the signal. In certain operating regimes (small
µ or short fiber length) this attack is no better than traditional intercept/resend, and we may
use the same defense function. However by changing the defense function appropriately (i.e.
granting Eve more information for each error bit received), one can in fact operate safely with
a larger mean photon number. For the operating configuration analyzed in this paper, the
result is still an optimal value of µ ≈ 1.1.
cFor this analysis, we assume, following Gilbert and Hamrick [6], that Bob is watching for anomalously high
numbers of double detections (when both detectors click). Without this precaution, Eve would be able to
send more than single-photon signals to Bob after successfully determining the state, and the attack would
be feasible if the total attenuation, including Bob’s receiver, was 18dB.
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6 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper we offer a detailed analytic model for an experimental, fiber-based quantum
cryptographic system, and a set of reasonable assumptions about Eve’s current technical
capabilities. We explicitly model total system behavior ranging from physical effects to the
results of quantum cryptographic protocols such as error correction and privacy amplification.
We then derive the optimal photon number (µ) for this system in a range of scenarios. One
interesting result is that µ ≈ 1.1 is optimal for a wide range of realistic, fiber-based QKD
systems; in fact, it provides about 10 times the distilled throughput of systems that employ
a more conventional µ = 0.1, without any adverse affect on system security, given an explicit
set of reasonable assumptions about Eve’s current capabilities.
This paper takes one more step in the ongoing exploration of optimal mean photon number
for a realistic system. Looking ahead, careful specification of a whole range of eavesdropping
threats, and necessary countermeasures, and of the quantitative effects of each potential threat
model, will be required before QKD can be trusted in practice. Broadly accepted analysis of
a wider range of eavesdropping techniques, under a range of technologies available to Alice,
Bob, and Eve, is thus desirable.
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Appendix A: Analytical Model
% File: model.m
%
% Description: Analytic model of QKD throughput
%
% Copyright (c) 2004 by BBN Technologies
%
% This is a Matlab / Octave model of the QKD throughput of a weak-coherent
% source using BB84 through fiber, given various parameters of the system.
% Key parameters include:
%
% pulseRate -- the repetition rate of the source, in Hz
% dutyCycle -- portion of pulses for payload (vs. header, training)
% mpn -- the mean photon number per pulse at Alice
% fiberLength -- the length of fiber, in km
% fiberLoss -- the attenuation of the fiber, in dB/km
% rxLoss -- receiver loss, in dB (Myers eta_rec, as dB)
% detEff{0,1} -- detector efficiency, for each detector (eta_det)
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% detLeak{0,1} -- leakage of other’s light into this detector (epsilon)
% pDark{0,1} -- probability that detector fires w/ no light
% pAfter{0,1} -- probability pulse results in unsuppressed afterpulse
% residPhase -- residual phase error, RMS, in radians
%
% blockSize -- number of bits in block for EDAC / privacy amplify
% nEdacSets -- number of subsets for EDAC
% estType -- entropy estimate type (’Bennett’, ’Slutsky’, ’Myers’)
% confidence -- probability Eve has more information than estimated
% siftType -- type of sifting (’BB84’, ’SARG’)
%
% eveChan -- for PNS, Eve’s multiplier on fiberLoss (0=perfect)
%
% This file defines typical values for these variables (which are all
% global variables), and functions which use them to compute the rate
% of detects, errors, and finished bits. To try different scenarios,
% you can simply modify the global parameters and re-execute the function.
global pulseRate dutyCycle mpn fiberLength fiberLoss rxLoss residPhase
global detEff0 detEff1 detLeak0 detLeak1 pDark0 pDark1 pAfter0 pAfter1
global blockSize nEdacSets estType confidence siftType eveChan
pulseRate = 5e6; % Alice-Bob link runs at 5MHz
dutyCycle = .8; % Measured duty cycle
mpn = .1; % Target value (was calibrated recently)
fiberLength = 10.55; % Length of fiber spool, in km
fiberLoss = .237; % dB/km for spool, if total = 2.5dB
rxLoss = 10.4; % measured loss (dB, average over all paths)
residPhase = 3 * pi/180; % not measured recently
detEff0 = .117; % from analysis of data
detEff1 = detEff0;
detLeak0 = .009;
detLeak1 = detLeak0;
pDark0 = 2.8e-5;
pDark1 = pDark0;
pAfter0 = .001; % SW/HW suppression should keep this quite low
pAfter1 = pAfter0;
blockSize = 4096; % Configured min (average slightly higher)
nEdacSets = 64; % Configured
estType = ’Bennett’; % Configured
confidence = 1e-6; % Hard-wired
siftType = ’BB84’; % Configured
eveChan = 0; % Assume Eve has perfect fiber
% sourceRate -- the raw rate of symbols at the source (not counting
% attenuation)
function r = sourceRate
global pulseRate dutyCycle
r = pulseRate * dutyCycle;
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endfunction
% Utility function to compute the probability of the union of a number of
% independent events
function p = probOr(varargin)
p = 1;
for i = (1:nargin)
p = p * (1-varargin{i});
endfor
p = 1 - p;
endfunction
% Here we estimate the probability of the different kinds of detections, and
% turn those probabilities into the sifted rate and QBER.
%
% pmCorr = probability that correct detector fires when bases match
% pmIncorr = probability that incorrect detector fires when bases match
% pwDetect = prob that detector fires when bases wrong (same for both D0 & D1)
function [rate, qber] = siftedRate
global mpn fiberLength fiberLoss rxLoss residPhase
global detEff0 detEff1 detLeak0 detLeak1 pDark0 pDark1 pAfter0 pAfter1
pDark = (pDark0 + pDark1) / 2;
e = (detEff0*detLeak0 + detEff1*detLeak1) / (detEff0 + detEff1);
atten = .1^(.1*(fiberLength*fiberLoss + rxLoss));
c = (detEff0+detEff1)/2 * mpn * atten / (1+detLeak0+detLeak1);
pwDetect = probOr (pDark, 1-exp(-c*(e + .5)));
pAfter = pwDetect * (pAfter0 + pAfter1) / 2;
pwDetect = probOr (pwDetect, pAfter);
pmCorr = probOr (pDark, pAfter, 1-exp(-c*(e + cos(residPhase/2)^2)));
pmIncorr = probOr (pDark, pAfter, 1-exp(-c*(e + sin(residPhase/2)^2)));
pmValid = probOr (pmCorr, pmIncorr);
rate = pmValid / 2 * sourceRate;
qber = (pmIncorr - pmCorr*pmIncorr) / pmValid;
endfunction
% EDAC overhead -- this is for the amount of extra information revealed,
% per bit, given the error rate. This is specifically for the BBN variant of
% Cascade, other protocols are likely to differ slightly. This also
% represents an average, over many blocks of slightly varying size and
% error rate. The estimate does not include the error bits themselves.
function ovhd = EDACoverhead (qber)
global nEdacSets blockSize
ovhd = qber*(1-log2(qber)) + nEdacSets / blockSize;
endfunction
% entropyEstimate -- this applies the specific entropy estimate chosen
% and then turns it into a fraction of the sifted bits. The entropy
% estimate here is the information Eve may be assumed to have derived
% from eavesdropping on the single-photon pulses, there is a separate
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% function for splitting multi-photon pulses.
%
% It can be tricky to compare estimates because of differing assumptions.
% The entropy derived in Bennett’s paper (BBBSS92) refers to the entire
% key string, including error bits -- they are kept in the string and
% accounted for as revealed information during error correction. The other
% estimates derive entropy on the non-error bits. In these functions,
% we standardize on Eve’s entropy on the non-error bits.
%
% We also explicitly subtract the privacy amplification overhead in the
% estimates, since this is different for the Myers-Pearson estimate (it
% uses Renyi order < 2).
function est = entropyEstimate(qber)
global estType blockSize confidence
b = blockSize;
e = qber*b;
switch (estType)
case ’Bennett’
est = bennett(b,e,confidence);
case ’Slutsky’
est = slutsky(b,e,confidence);
case ’Myers’
est = myers(b,e,confidence);
otherwise
error(’Unknown entropy estimate type %s’,estType);
end
est = est/blockSize;
endfunction
function est = bennett(b,e,confidence)
t = 2.828427*e;
dev2 = 6.828427*e;
conf1 = sqrt(2) * erfinv(1-confidence);
est = b - e - t - conf1*sqrt(dev2);
est = est + 2*log2(confidence);
endfunction
function est = slutsky(b,e,confidence)
conf1 = erfinv(1-confidence);
eprime = min(e / b + conf1 / sqrt(2*b), 1/3);
t = (1 - 3*eprime) / (1 - eprime);
t = (1 + 1.442695*log(1 - 0.5*t*t)) * (b-e);
dev2 = (b-e)/2;
est = b - e - t - conf1*sqrt(dev2);
est = est + 2*log2(confidence);
endfunction
% estimatePNSbits -- how many bits to discard because of "undetectable"
% eavesdropping, i.e. photon-number splitting attacks or unambiguous state
% discrimination (PNS or USD). This version is essentially Bennett’s
% with a more accurate expression for multi-photon pulses. We assume
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% that in all multi-photon pulses, one is captured by Eve and stored until
% the bases are announced.
function mpdisc = estimatePNSbits(sift)
global mpn detEff0 detEff1 rxLoss
p0 = exp(-mpn);
p1 = p0*mpn;
p2x = 1-p0-p1;
m = p2x / (p1+p2x);
mpdisc = m * sift;
endfunction
% estimatePNSgh -- Gilbert & Hamrick’s estimate of Eve’s information from
% "undetectable" eavesdropping
function mpdisc = estimatePNSgh(sift)
global fiberLength fiberLoss mpn detEff0 detEff1 rxLoss eveChan
p0 = exp(-mpn);
p1 = p0*mpn;
p2 = p1*mpn/2;
p2x = 1-p0-p1;
s2 = sqrt(2);
y = .1^(.1*(fiberLength*fiberLoss*eveChan + rxLoss)) * (detEff0+detEff1)/2;
m1 = p2x - 1/(1-y)*(exp(-mpn*y)-exp(-mpn)*(1+mpn*(1-y)));
m2 = p2*y + 1 - exp(-mpn)*(s2*sinh(mpn/s2)+2*cosh(mpn/s2)-1);
m3 = p2*y + exp(-mpn)*(sinh(mpn)-s2*sinh(mpn/s2));
p2k = p2;
for k = (2:20)
p2k = p2k * mpn * mpn / (k*(4*k-2));
m3 = m3 + p2k*max(1-(1-y)^(2*k-1),1-2^(1-k));
endfor
m = max([m1,m2,m3]);
mpdisc = m * sourceRate / 2;
endfunction
% estimatePNSb -- Bennett, et al.’s estimate for Eve’s information from
% "undetectable" eavesdropping (BBBSS92)
function mpdisc = estimatePNSb(sift)
global mpn
mpdisc = sift*mpn;
endfunction
% distilledRate -- this is the final answer, number of distilled bits per
% second.
function rate = distilledRate
global confidence
[sift, qber] = siftedRate;
ovhd = EDACoverhead(qber);
ent = entropyEstimate(qber);
mpd = estimatePNSbits(sift);
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mpd = mpd + sqrt(2)*erfinv(1-confidence) * sqrt(mpd*(1-mpd/sift));
rate = max(sift*(ent-ovhd) - mpd, 0);
endfunction
% Myers/Pearson entropy estimate
%
% First we find the probability p for which the first k terms of the binomial
% distribution binom(n,i)*p^i*(1-p)^(n-i) sum up to ’confidence’, the
% probability that we’re wrong.
%
% Then, given this probability, p, the best conditional probability of Eve
% correctly guessing a bit is:
%
% pe = .5 + sqrt( p/(1-p) * (1 - p/(1-p)) )
%
% Then Eve’s least Renyi entropy (order R) for the n-k non-error bits is:
%
% h(R) = (n-k)/(1-R) * log2(pe^R + (1-pe)^R)
%
% Now from Cachin’s paper (Smooth Entropy and Renyi Entropy), theorem 8,
% we know that the amount of smooth entropy (which we can feed into privacy
% amplification) is at least:
%
% h(R) - log2(m+1) - r/(R-1) - t - 2
%
% where m-log2(m+1) = n+t, and 2^(-r)+2^(-t) = confidence.
%
% If we ignore the negligible effect of t on the value of log(m), the optimal
% values of r and t are:
%
% r = log2(R/confidence)
% t = log2(R/((R-1)*confidence))
%
% and the value of m is approximately:
%
% m = n + t + log2(n+t+1)
% or m = n + t + log2(n+t+1+log2(n+t+1+log2(n+t+1))) etc.
%
% In our internal function, we negate this, so we can minimize.
function h = myers_neg_renyi_entropy (r)
global myers_n myers_k myers_confidence myers_pe
h = (myers_n - myers_k) / (1-r) * log2(myers_pe^r + (1-myers_pe)^r);
t = log2(r/((r-1)*myers_confidence));
h = h - log2(myers_n+t+1+log2(myers_n+t+1+log2(myers_n+t+1)));
h = h - log2(r/myers_confidence)/(r-1) - t - 2;
h = -h;
endfunction
% Another internal function -- the sum of the first myers_k terms of the
% binomial distribution, minus myers_confidence (so we can find a zero)
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function s = myers_binomtail (p)
global myers_n myers_k myers_confidence
k1 = myers_k;
k2 = myers_n-myers_k;
if (k1 > k2)
k1 = k2;
k2 = myers_k;
endif
% Compute the highest term, then go backwards
if (k1*log(myers_n) < 200)
% exact if < 10^86
l = 1;
for i = 1:k1
l = l * (myers_n-i+1) / i;
endfor
t = l * p^myers_k * (1-p)^(myers_n-myers_k);
else
% otherwise use Stirling’s approximation
k1 = k1+1;
k2 = k2+1;
n1 = myers_n+1;
l = 1 - .5*log(2*pi);
l = l + (1/(n1) - 1/(k1) - 1/(k2)) / 12;
l = l - (1/(n1)^3 - 1/(k1)^3 - 1/(k2)^3) / 360;
l = l + (1/(n1)^5 - 1/(k1)^5 - 1/(k2)^5) / 1260;
l = l + (n1-.5)*log(n1) - (k1-.5)*log(k1) - (k2-.5)*log(k2);
t = exp(l + myers_k*log(p) + (myers_n-myers_k)*log(1-p));
endif
% Now loop back to the beginning, but exit if we stop changing sum
s = t - myers_confidence;
for k1 = (myers_k-1:-1:0)
t = t * (k1+1) * (1-p) / (p * (myers_n-k1));
s1 = s + t;
if s1 == s
break
endif
s = s1;
endfor
endfunction
function entropy = myers(n,k,confidence)
global myers_n myers_k myers_confidence myers_pe
% Approximate starting point
p = 1 - InvBetaApprox(n-k,k,confidence);
myers_n = n;
myers_k = k;
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myers_confidence = confidence;
% Solve for probability p, and compute Eve’s probability of guessing
p = fzero(’myers_binomtail’,p);
p = min(p,1/3);
myers_pe = .5 + sqrt( p/(1-p) * (1 - p/(1-p)) );
% Maximize entropy measure over Renyi order R
r = fminbnd(’myers_neg_renyi_entropy’,1.01,2);
% Return the maximized entropy
entropy = -myers_neg_renyi_entropy(r);
endfunction
% Abramowitz and Stegun approximation for the inverse of the incomplete
% Beta function
function v = InvBetaApprox(a,b,p)
y = sqrt(2) * erfinv(1-2*p);
l = y*y/6 - .5;
a1 = 1/(2*a-1);
b1 = 1/(2*b-1);
h = 2/(a1+b1);
w = y*sqrt(h+l)/h - (b1-a1)*(l+5/6-2/(3*h));
v = a/(a+b*exp(2*w));
endfunction
